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Contribution of the Health Ombud to Accountability: 
The Life Esidimeni Tragedy in South Africa
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Introduction 
Between October 2015 and June 2016, 1,711 people were relocated from mental health facilities operated 
by long-term provider Life Esidimeni in the South African province of Gauteng to alternative facilities 
managed by multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The result of the change in providers, and 
the manner in which the transfers were managed, became a tragedy that culminated in the death of 144 
mental health care patients and the exposure of 1,418 others to torture, trauma, and poor health outcomes.1 
The state was unable to ascertain the whereabouts of a further 44 patients.
The tragedy began in October 2015, when the then member of the Executive Council for health in the 
populous Gauteng province, which includes Johannesburg and Pretoria, announced the termination of a 
40-year contract between the Department of Health and Life Esidimeni for the provision of mental health 
services.2 The NGO facilities to which the patients were transferred were ill prepared and ill equipped for 
the influx of patients.3 The tragedy drew further public attention in September 2016, when, responding to 
a question raised in Parliament, the member of the Executive Council for health said that about 36 former 
residents of Life Esidimeni had died under mysterious circumstances following their transfers. 
South Africa’s minister of health then requested that the newly established Office of the Health Ombud 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths of mentally ill patients and advise on the way forward.4
Accountability and the health ombud 
Accountability serves to constrain or limit power and prevent its abuse or misuse.5 Mechanisms are re-
quired to track the actions of those in power, sanction any misuse of authority, and avert or redress abuses 
of power.6 Accountability creates avenues by which those with responsibilities explain the interventions 
they have implemented and steps taken to remedy any gaps that have been identified.7 To promote transpar-
ency around accountability, states are obligated to fulfill the right to access information and the freedom to 
form and belong to associations.8 Within health systems, accountability is often exercised at several levels, 
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including the legal, social, administrative, and po-
litical.9 With regard to ensuring accountability in 
realizing the right to health of vulnerable groups, 
the LC v. Peru case emphasized the need for states 
to put in place legal avenues, national tribunals, and 
other public institutions to ensure accountability in 
the realization of women’s rights.10 
South Africa established the Office of the 
Health Ombud to promote accountability. The 
office is empowered to receive verbal and written 
complaints and to investigate and dispose of these 
complaints in an economical, fair, and expeditious 
manner.11 Health ombudspersons are not unique 
to South Africa. England, New Zealand, and 
Australia, for example, also have health ombud-
spersons (who are sometimes also referred to as 
health commissioners). England appointed its first 
ombudsperson in 1973, New Zealand in 1994, and 
Australia in the 1980s (through the appointment of 
state-level health complaints commissioners).12 An 
ombudsperson usually refers to an official elected 
by parliament or government with a mandate to 
represent citizens’ interests and to investigate and 
deal with complaints concerning public (and some-
times private) agencies.13 
In South Africa, the Office of the Health 
Ombud is an independent body established by the 
National Health Amendment Act of 2013. The of-
fice is functionally located in the Office of Health 
Standards Compliance (OHSC) and is assisted by 
persons designated by the OHSC.14 The OHSC, 
which was also created by the National Health 
Amendment Act of 2013, has the overall mandate 
of promoting and protecting the health and safety 
of users of health services. Under the OHSC, the 
ombud office is officially designated as “Complaints 
Management and the Ombud.”
The health ombud is responsible for addressing 
lapses and malpractices in the health setting with a 
view to protecting the rights of patients and users 
of the health care system.15 For each complaint, the 
ombud is required to report his or her findings and 
recommendations back to the complainant and the 
health facility; to make recommendations for action 
to the chief executive officer of the OHSC, who must 
then ensure that the recommendations are imple-
mented; and to conduct a thorough investigation 
with the assistance of OHSC staff by obtaining state-
ments and evidence from relevant individuals.16 
In June 2016, the first health ombud (Malegapu-
ru William Makgoba) was appointed by the minister 
of health. In making the appointment, the minister 
emphasized that the ombud would act as a “public 
protector” for health, since he would deal with com-
plaints from those who were dissatisfied with health 
service delivery.17 The minister asserted that this move 
was prompted by the significant increase in claims 
of medical negligence and by a failure to address 
litigants’ claims, which resulted in the government 
spending large sums of money on compensation. He 
stressed that the ombud office would not only receive 
and address complaints but also pursue effective en-
forcement and remedial measures.18 
The health ombud’s findings regarding the 
Life Esidimeni tragedy
Following a request from the minister of health, the 
Office of the Health Ombud conducted a thorough 
investigation that relied on evidence provided by 
numerous stakeholders, which culminated in the 
publication of a comprehensive report entitled The 
Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of Men-
tally Ill Patients: Gauteng Province.19 The office’s 
investigation found that 94 patients (subsequently 
increased to over 100) died between March 23, 2016, 
and December 19, 2016, in three hospitals and 16 
NGO facilities. The report notes that all 27 NGO 
facilities involved in the patient transfers oper-
ated without a license and that all of the patients 
who died did so under “unlawful” circumstances. 
Overall, about 95% of the deaths occurred in NGO 
facilities.20 
The Office of the Health Ombud also found 
that the decision to terminate the contract with 
Life Esidimeni contradicted South Africa’s Nation-
al Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategy. 
Rather than the deinstitutionalization of patients 
being carried out gradually, as envisaged by the pol-
icy, it was rushed and disorganized, and functional 
community-based services were not in place.21 The 
report stated that the cost rationale for termination 
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of the contract was not acceptable because it failed 
to respect the fundamental rights of the patients. 
Furthermore, the Gauteng Department of Health 
failed to develop a plan to ensure that the money 
that had been saved from the contract’s termination 
was used for the benefit of the patients.22 The inves-
tigation also found that the psychiatric hospitals to 
which some of the patients were moved cost almost 
twice as much as care at Life Esidimeni. Although 
some of the NGO facilities were far less expensive, 
the ombud observed, they offered substandard care 
and lacked certain vital health services, which ulti-
mately led to the patients’ suffering and death.23 This 
is inconsistent with the government’s obligation to 
realize the right to health of vulnerable people.
The ombud reported that the Gauteng Mental 
Health Marathon Project, as it became known, was 
done in a rush, with “chaotic” execution. The patients 
were transferred in an inhumane and degrading 
manner, with no written plan for their transporta-
tion. Some had their hands and feet tied throughout 
the move, some suffered trauma as a result of being 
moved without their families knowing where they 
had gone, and some were transferred without their 
clinical records and personal belongings.24 
The report notes that most of the NGO facil-
ities where the patients died lacked the necessary 
experience and capacity to deal with the situation. 
Conditions included overcrowding, poor hygiene, 
low-quality or insufficient food, a lack of qualified 
staff, and a lack of access to medicines and other 
supplies.25 The causes of the deaths were unnatural 
and preventable and included chronic hepatitis, liv-
er failure, pneumonia, uncontrolled seizures, and 
neuroglycopenic brain injury.26
Issues of noncompliance with health regula-
tions were identified, including accommodating 
more patients than permitted by the operating 
license and NGOs being granted licenses to operate 
without being registered as legal entities or without 
adequate staffing. Some facilities were simply resi-
dential premises.27
The health ombud’s recommendations
One of the key recommendations of the ombud was 
to overhaul the health care system for mentally ill 
patients. He also recommended disciplinary action 
against government officials for their complicity in 
the deaths of more than 100 patients.28 
In responding to the recommendations, the 
government held a press conference in February 
2017 in which the minister of health, Aaron Mot-
soaledi, announced that disciplinary processes 
had been initiated against several senior health 
officials.29 During the arbitration process, it was re-
ported that 1,418 patients who had suffered trauma 
and poor health but survived had been returned to 
Life Esidimeni facilities for continued care.30
Another recommendation of the ombud called 
for an “alternative dispute resolution process” led 
by a credible and experienced South African. This 
led to a comprehensive arbitration process that 
culminated in the acknowledgment by government 
officials of those who died or suffered as a result of 
the move from Life Esidimeni.31 
In March 2018, the arbitrator, Justice Dikgang 
Moseneke, delivered an elaborate and stinging 
arbitration award.32 In agreement with the health 
ombud report, the arbitrator asserted that the pub-
lic officials behind the project had acted irrationally 
and had abused their power. He concluded that the 
project had been characterized by mismanagement, 
secrecy, a lack of accountability and transparency, 
and ulterior motives that remained unknown, all 
of which led to the suffering and death of mental 
health care users. The arbitration revealed that the 
human rights violations suffered by the patients 
had amounted to torture. Torture includes system-
atic acts that are not only unkind but also hateful 
and directed at bodily and psychological pain and 
harassment. As one expert witness stated: 
If you take a group who didn’t know the move was 
coming, weren’t prepared for it and are moved 
on the backs of trucks, tied with sheets without 
identity documents, without wheel chairs, that 
amounts to torture. And then they are moved 
into filthy dangerous environments as if they are 
not human … All those are features of actively 
torturing people in these institutions.33
The arbitrator further emphasized that by pre-
e. durojaye and d. k. agaba  / perspective, 161-168
164
D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 8    V O L U M E  2 0    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal
maturely terminating the Life Esidimeni contract 
without a reasonable alternative, the state violated 
mental health care users’ rights, including the 
rights to life; to freedom from torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; to human dig-
nity; and to health and its underlying determinants 
(such as food and water). He noted that by expos-
ing mental health care users to under-resourced 
NGOs, the state facilitated the abuse of users’ rights 
by third parties.34 He further asserted that the 
Gauteng Mental Health Marathon Project treated 
mental health care users and their families as recip-
ients of—and not active participants in—decisions 
affecting their lives. Patients and families were not 
involved in the decision to move them from Life 
Esidimeni, and any attempts to contest the move 
were ignored or met with disdain.35 
Having laid out the egregious violations, the 
arbitrator ordered the government to pay appropri-
ate compensation to the families of those who died. 
This amount was to be in addition to the 20,000 
rand (US$1,390) that the government had offered, 
leading to a total of 1.2 million rand (US$8,000), 
which was to be paid within three months.36 While 
giving his ruling, the arbitrator pointed out that he 
was aware that several other potential claimants 
had not appeared before him and that if these 
individuals came forward, they were to be com-
pensated in the same way, rather than requiring a 
new litigation process.37 The arbitrator ordered the 
government to provide counseling and support ser-
vices to all claimants who requested them. He also 
ordered it to construct a monument at its expense 
within 12 months of the publication of the award to 
commemorate the suffering caused by the project.38 
The provincial department of health was ordered 
to provide the Office of the Health Ombud and 
claimants with a recovery plan aimed at systemic 
change in the delivery of mental health care.39 It was 
required to report to the ombud within six months.
The negative press and attention caused by 
both the ombud’s report and the arbitration pro-
ceedings forced the resignation of the three senior 
officials who had been in charge of the Gauteng 
Mental Health Marathon Project. 
In June 2018, the media reported that the 
Gauteng government had paid compensation to 
the families involved in the arbitration and was 
also providing counseling.40 At the time of writ-
ing, inquiries and investigations by several state 
bodies—including the police, National Prosecuting 
Authority, and Special Investigations Unit—were 
underway to ascertain the possibility of filing 
criminal charges against those at the helm of the 
Gauteng Mental Health Marathon Project.41 Disap-
pointingly, it was recently reported that one of the 
public officials implicated in the tragedy had been 
reelected to the Provincial Executive Committee 
of the African National Congress, which drew the 
condemnation of many.42 
While the health ombud’s role in the Life Es-
idimeni tragedy has been applauded, his handling 
of a more recent case has come under criticism 
for being more critical of a whistle blower than of 
the complaints made by him.43 The South African 
Medical Association has said that even if there were 
discrepancies in the whistle blower’s complaint, by 
focusing on him, the ombud had discouraged oth-
ers from coming out and reporting incidences of 
malpractice and human rights violations. 
Nonetheless, with regard to the Life Esidi-
meni tragedy, the ombud played a crucial role in 
promoting health accountability in South Africa. 
His comprehensive report was instrumental in 
producing a chain of events leading to redress and 
compensation of the mental health care users who 
had suffered as a result of the project, including the 
families of those who had died. 
Improving the accountability role 
Monitoring and enforcing remedies
In practice, accountability entities tend to lean 
toward either monitoring the actions of duty-bear-
ers or enforcing remedies. Monitoring focuses on 
gathering information and asking duty-bearers 
to justify their conduct.44 Enforcement examines 
sanctions or remedial and corrective measures to 
meet standards, and it aims to ensure that remedies 
are fulfilled and improper behavior is addressed.45 
Human rights commissions and bodies often 
tend to focus on monitoring and exposing human 
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rights violations.46 Similarly, the health ombud of-
ten takes on a monitoring role and produces and 
disseminates reports arising from complaints. This 
is one element of access to information.47 But the 
ombud’s enforcement role can be limited.
The powers given to the health ombud by the 
National Health Amendment Act are, to a large 
extent, “recommendatory.” The act empowers the 
ombud to conduct an investigation and then sub-
mit a report that includes his or her findings and 
recommendations to the chief executive officer of 
OHSC. If the OHSC fails to address the recommen-
dations, the ombud may ask the minister of health 
to intervene.48 The challenge with this arrangement 
is that the ombud’s enforcement and remedial pow-
ers are dependent on an external source. This may 
pose a challenge if the chief executive officer of the 
OHSC or the minister of health do not prioritize 
the recommendations. 
In Queensland, Australia, the ombudsper-
son has enforcement powers in certain cases. The 
Queensland Health Ombudsman Act of 2013 grants 
the ombudsperson the authority to take immediate 
action if there is a risk to persons and to safeguard 
public health and safety. The ombudsperson can sus-
pend health practitioners, impose conditions on their 
registration, and prohibit or limit them from practic-
ing.49 In New Zealand and England, as the roles of the 
health ombudspersons have evolved, their investiga-
tive and disciplinary powers have been strengthened 
through legislation. They have the power to ask agen-
cies to report back on steps that have been taken to 
implement the recommendations.50 
In doing so, these countries have strengthened 
ombudspersons’ accountability role by enabling 
them to enforce their remedies. Thus, it is hoped 
that the relatively new position of the health ombud 
in South Africa will eventually go beyond monitor-
ing to include enforcement as well. 
There is also the issue of the office’s capacity to 
deal with complaints. After it was reported that in 
2016/17 only 15% of investigations had been finalized 
by the ombud within six months of the complaints’ 
filing dates, the budget for the complaints man-
agement process (which includes the Office of the 
Health Ombud) was slated to be increased from 14.8 
million rand in 2017/18 to 20.5 million in 2020/21.51 
Nature of complaints
Another element of the ombud’s accountability 
role is the individualized and retrospective nature 
of the complaints that the ombud may receive. 
South Africa’s health ombud is empowered by the 
National Health Amendment Act to receive both 
written and verbal complaints pertaining to any 
act or omission by the owner or an employee of a 
health establishment or a facility charged with pro-
viding health services. The ombud is then required 
to investigate each complaint fairly and expedi-
tiously and then inform the complainant of his or 
her findings.52 This is an individualized process 
involving the ombudsperson, the complainant, and 
the health establishment. 
In commenting on New Zealand’s complaints 
system, Ron Paterson notes that “an ombudsman 
is little more than the proverbial ambulance at the 
bottom of the cliff if all that is achieved is retro-
spective analysis of how and why a patient’s rights 
were breached.”53 He illustrates that if a health 
provider implements the ombudsperson’s recom-
mendations by doing away with the shortcomings 
in the provider’s practice, then it may be said that 
the ombudsperson’s role has been realized at the in-
dividual level. Paterson explores how the resolution 
of such individual complaints can then be exploited 
to enhance health service delivery at a broader lev-
el. He proposes the utilization of the reports that 
are produced by the ombudsperson for educational 
purposes and for advocacy on behalf of health care 
consumers.54
In the case of South Africa, a series of issues 
contributed to the health ombud’s taking up of the 
Life Esidimeni case. The arbitration award was a 
result of over two years of varied tactics, including 
rights education; advocacy; engagement with the 
government, the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the right to health, and watchdog bodies (such 
as parliamentary portfolio committees, the Mental 
Health Review Board, and the South African Hu-
man Rights Commission); and litigation by various 
actors, such as Section 27, NGO networks, mental 
health support and advocacy groups, professional 
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associations, and families of people using mental 
health services.55 These strategies also ensured that 
the media never lost interest in the case, which 
prompted the minister of health to request the new-
ly appointed ombud to conduct an investigation.56 
The release of the ombud’s report led to a series of 
actions aimed not only at preventing similar deaths 
from occurring in the future but also at improving 
the mental health care system in general.57 
The question that arises here is what happens 
with cases that are not picked up by the media, 
civil society, or the public. Will such cases remain 
“individualized” to the complainants and health 
establishments involved? This remains to be seen, 
as the Office of the Health Ombud is still relatively 
new and in the process of establishing its mode of 
operation. Still, it is vital that accountability entities 
such as the health ombud do not work in isolation. 
Accountability is the result of a concerted and 
dynamic effort by a series of actors using various 
strategies over time.
In order to enhance the ombud’s educational 
role, the National Health Amendment Act also 
requires the ombud to prepare a report on the 
functions and affairs of its activities, which the 
minister of health then presents to Parliament.58 In 
this way, accountability is not an isolated activity 
but rather an integrated one aimed at improving 
quality of health care for health consumers and at 
strengthening the health system. The enhancement 
of the accountability role of the health ombud is 
vital in the South African health system, which has 
a legacy of challenges related to its apartheid past, 
including inequalities and disparities in access 
to health exacerbated by large numbers of people 
living in poverty, a public-private divide, failure 
by health leadership to overcome mismanagement 
at the provincial and district levels, and a lack of 
health workers in public health facilities.59
Conclusion 
South Africa’s establishment of the Office of the 
Health Ombud is a commendable step toward im-
proving health accountability in South Africa. The 
newly established health ombud played a critical 
role in promoting justice in the Life Esidimeni 
tragedy. However, not all of the ombud’s recom-
mendations have been fulfilled, particularly those 
involving criminal liability. 
The ombud’s enforcement and remedial 
powers need to be strengthened so that its recom-
mendations are not stalled by people in positions 
of power. The complaints mechanism would be 
more effective if it focused less on individual com-
plaints concerning past events and more on system 
failings. Consequently, the health ombud should 
aim not just to resolve individual claims but to 
use its educational and information-sharing roles 
to address the numerous challenges facing South 
Africa’s health system. 
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